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PORSCHE OR PINTO? THE IMPACT OF 
THE "MOTOR VOTER REGISTRATION 
ACT" ON BLACK POUTICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
NATHAN V. GEMMITI* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration of Independence proclaims that the government 
derives its "powers from the consent of the governed."l The framers of 
the Constitution wrote the words, "We the People," to create a country 
founded on the principles of freedom, democracy, and equality.2 Ironi-
cally, these ideals c<H:xisted within a political structure that excluded 
from the right to self-government anyone who was not a white lan-
downing male.3 The creative contradiction of "all men are created 
equal," did not begin to erode until the ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1870, when Black4 men in America were given the right 
to vote.5 It would be another fifty years before Black women would also 
be enfranchised.6 Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, five consti-
tutional amendments have dealt with voting.7 The United States' his-
tory of political disenfranchisement lingers and continues to perpetu-
ate a democratic system where only half of the population votes.s As 
recently as 1965, when Martin Luther King,jr. led non-violent protests 
in Selma, Alabama, to bring civil rights to the nation's attention, only 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
2 U.S. CONST. pmble. 
3 See infra notes 55-58. In the first presidential election of George Washington, only 6% of 
the population voted. Donald W. Rogers, Introduction: The Right to Vote in American History, in 
VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992). 
4 I use "Black" throughout this Note to refer to American citizens of African descent. "Black" 
is capitalized because it denotes racial and cultural identities, not solely physical appearance. 
Conversely, the word "white" is not capitalized because it is not ordinarily used in the same sense. 
See Kennenth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63, 64 n.7 (1993). 
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1. 
7 See generaUy U.S. CONST. amends. XlV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
8 See NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES AND 
STRUCTURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (9th ed. 1996). 
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2.1 % of the state's registered voters were Black-although Blacks com-
prised 57.6% of the population.9 
"If democracy is America's civil religion, voting is its most impor-
tant sacrament. "10 In 1964, the Supreme Court pronounced: "No right 
is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the 
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we 
must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to 
vote is undermined."l1 Still, millions of eligible Americans do not 
exercise this right. I2 In 1992, the U.S. had its highest voter participation 
rate in twenty years; more than 104 million voted.I3 However, over 
eighty-five million Americans who were eligible to vote did not.14 The 
dismal reality is that the United States ranks almost last among the 
world's democracies in voter turnout-twenty-three out of twenty-
four. 15 
The most dominant explanation for this lack of political partici-
pation is overly restrictive voter registration laws. I6 Once registered, 
Americans tend to vote at roughly similar rates as Western Europeans.I7 
In the United States, voter registration does not occur automatically as 
a benefit of citizenship as it does in most countries. IS An individual 
must take the requisite steps to register to vote. I9 In states that have 
9 See David Kunset, Introduction to VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 1,9 (Karen McGill Arrington 
et al. eds., 1992). In Selma, only 156 of over 15,000 eligible Blacks were registered. See id. 
10 Id. at 2. 
11 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
12 See POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 8, at 3. 
13 See id. at 5. 
14 See id. at 3. Voter turnout for recent presidential elections: 1960 (65.4%); 1964 (63.3%); 
1968 (62.3%); 1972 (57.1%); 1976 (55.2%); 1980 (54.3%); 1984 (55.2%); 1988 (50.1%); 1992 
(55.2%). See id. at 5. 
l5See id. at 4. Australia (93.8%); Belgium (93.4%); Austria (90.5%); Italy (90.5%); Iceland 
(90.1%); Luxembourg (87.3%); New Zealand (87.2%); Sweden (86.0%); Netherlands (85.8%); 
Denmark (85.7%); Greece (84.5%); Germany (84.3%); Norway (84.0%); Israel (79.7%); Finland 
(77.6%); Canada (75.5%); United Kingdom (75.4%); Portugal (72.6%);Japan (71.4%); Spain 
(70.6%); Ireland (68.5%); France (66.2%); United States (52.8%); Switzerland (46.1%). See id. 
(citing THOMAS T. MACKIE & RICHARD ROSE, THE INTERNATIONAL ALMANAC OF ELECTION HIS-
TORY (1991». 
16 See generally POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 8, at 8. 
17 See id. at 9. Average turnout of registered voters: Australia (93.8%); Belgium (93.4%); 
Austria (90.5%); Italy (90.5%); Iceland (90.1%); Luxembourg (87.3%); New Zealand (87.2%); 
United States (86.8%). See id. Registration and voting by registrants in percentages: 1968 (74.3% 
registered /91 % of registered voters who voted); 1972 (72.3%/87%); 1976 (66.7%/89%); 1980 
(66.9%/89%); 1984 (68.3%/88%). See Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS 
DON'T VOTE 262 (1988). 
18 See POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 8, at 9-10. 
19 See id. at 10. 
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liberal registration policies, such as election-day registration, the turn-
out rate is considerably higher than the rest of the country.20 
Of the millions of Americans who do not participate in their 
government, many Blacks have been locked out by barriers that are 
the ''vestiges of the crudest forms of exclusion and intimidation of the 
past. "21 Voter registration laws were initially developed by reconstruc-
tionist white males in response to a fear that newly freed Black slaves 
would have an influence over the political system.22 The history of the 
United States is plagued with 'Jim Crow"-type23 discriminatory registra-
tion laws designed to decrease Black voting strength and maintain the 
socio-economic and political status quO.24 Remnants of these laws still 
exist today and continue to disenfranchise many eligible Black voters.25 
Nationally, only 37% of the eligible Black population went to the polls 
in 1994.26 
A muted minority political voice translates into lower account-
ability from politicians and a lack of proportional representation. For 
example, only one out of one hundred Senators are Black, although 
Black Americans comprise 13% of the population.27Jn addition, when 
a state's voter participation rate is high, economic benefits are more 
evenly spread to all residents throughout that state.28 
20 See id. at 11. Maine (73.9%); Minnesota (73.2%); Wisconsin (67.2%); North Dakota, which 
has no voter registration requirement, (66.5%). See id. (citing KIMBALL W. BRACE, THE ELECTION 
DATA BOOK 7,10 (1992)). 
21 Kunset, supra note 9, at 3. 
22 See Hearings on Voter Registration Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on House 
Admin., lOlth Congo 136 (1989) [hereinafter 1989Hearings] (testimony of Jesse Jackson, Presi-
dent, National Rainbow Coalition); see also Note, The Purging of Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws 
and the Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 483, 485 (1988) [hereinafter Purging of 
EmpowermenfJ; Burt Neuborne, Edited Comments on Affirmative Action in the Economic and Political 
Contexts, 95 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 431, 432 (1995) (stating voter registration may have been imposed 
as an anti-corruption measure; however, structurally it allowed the political elite to keep power). 
25 The term refers to the systematic practice of segregating and suppressing Black Americans. 
The term is derived from a character named Jim Crow in a play by Thomas D. Rice. See AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 704 (William Morris ed., 1976). 
24 See Rogers, supra note 3, at 12. 
25 See id.; Dayna L. Cunningham, ~ Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of 
Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 370, 372 (1991); see also Eric T. 
Secoy, Note, Providing Access to Voter Registration: A Model State Statute, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
479, 489 (1987). "[I]ndirect barriers [to voting] may be just as effective in abridging rights as 
direct barriers." Id. 
26 See Minorities Take Leave of Democracy, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 13, 1996, at B2. Nearly 
47% of registered whites cast ballots, also a dismal turnout. See id. 
27 See Donna Cassata, Freshman Class Boasts Resumes to Back Up 'Outsider'Image, CONGo Q. 
WKLY. REp., Nov. 12, 1994, at 9. In addition, only 4% of the 1994 Freshman Congress was Black. 
See id. 
28 See Bob Minzesheimer & Martha T. Moore, Lifting the Curtain on Low Turnout: Big Money, 
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This Note suggests that, as a result of a history of voter discrimi-
nation in the United States, Black Americans register at lower rates 
than white Americans.29 The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
(NVRA or the Act) ,30 nicknamed the "Motor Voter Act,"31 was written 
to reduce the direct and damaging effect that restrictive federal regis-
tration laws have on Black voter participation.32 The NVRA reduced 
many barriers by shifting the onus to register from the individual to 
the government. The Act was a good start. However, in order to give 
a voice to all citizens, the federal government should institute more 
inclusive programs used by some states. This would achieve the ulti-
mate goal of achieving higher voter participation among all Ameri-
cans.33 
Part II will provide an overview of America's history of discrimi-
nation against Black citizens, in order to fully understand the gravity 
of the barriers to voting equality. Part III will trace the legislative history 
of the NVRA, to illustrate that significant opposition still exists to 
removing registration barriers. Part IV will evaluate the successes and 
limitations of the NVRA, which was instituted nationwide for the first 
time in the 1996 Presidential elections. Finally, Part V will explore 
election-day registration, an alternative state program that has demon-
strated the most successful voter participation rates in the country. 
Media, DuU Race Among Facturs Behind Apathy, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 1996, at 4A. But see Everett 
Caroll Ladd, Participation in American Elections, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY, 115 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992) (concluding low participation rates do not damage a 
democratic system because voters and non-voters have virtually the same interest). 
29 Although this statement applies to Hispanic and Asian citizens, the Note will only evaluate 
voter turnout for Blacks. For an in-depth analysis of the impact of minority voting in a democratic 
political system, see generally WILLIAM R. KEECH, THE IMPACT OF NEGRO VOTING: THE ROLE OF 
THE VOTE IN THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1968). 
30 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1973gg-10 (Supp. 1993» [hereinafter NVRAJ. 
31 The Act received this "nickname" due to a major provision allowing for voter registration 
at state agencies including the Department of Motor Vehicles. See generaUy id. §§ 1973gg-5. 
32 See id. § 1973gg (listing Congressional findings upon which the Act was based). 
33 This Note does not suggest that all citizens must vote; non-voting is also acceptable in our 
political system. However, the decision not to vote should be made by the individual, not forced 
upon him or her by a failure to surmount a bureaucratically imposed voting barrier. See Pervill 
Squire, Is On-Site Voter Registration Desirable?, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL SELEC-
TION 229, 236 (Gary L. Rose ed., 1991). For a comprehensive analysis on the right not to vote, 
see generally Jeffrey A. Blomberg, Note, Protecting the Right Not to Vote for Voter Purge Statutes, 64 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1015 (1995). 
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II. A NATIONAL HISTORY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
A. Enslavement: America's Original Sin 
The first Black Americans were indentured servants or appren-
tices-not slaves.M England had no history of slavery; therefore, the 
first twenty Black individuals brought to Jamestown in 1619 had the 
same status in society as white indentured servants.35 At the time, there 
were no discriminatory laws; Black and white colonists lived, worked, 
and socialized together on an equal basis.36 
Upon completion of their indentured servitude, these Black pio-
neers followed the "American Dream. "37 They earned money, bought 
property, and had indentured servants of their own.3S Blacks voted in 
eleven of the thirteen original colonies and held minor political of-
fices. 39 
However, their social status began to deteriorate.40 Speaking a 
different language, having different customs, and darker skin pigmen-
tation began to translate to biological assumptions of Black inferiority.41 
As the colonies grew and experienced labor shortages, Black inferiority 
became the rationale for enslavement.42 Eventually, slavery was legal-
ized in six of the thirteen colonies between 1619 and 1664.43 
Beginning in 1630 with the Hugh Davis Case, colonial courts be-
gan to lay the legal foundation for racial inferiority.44 Hugh Davis was 
a white male Virginian.45 He was tried for having sexual relations with 
a Black woman.46 The court sentenced him to whipping for "defiling 
his body in lying with a negro. "47 Mter 1640, Black Americans could 
34 See LAWRENCE J. HANKS, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN THREE 
GEORGIA COUNTIES 2 (1987); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
IN AMERICAN LAw AND POLITICS 11-12 (1978). 
55 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 2. 
~6 See id. 
~7 See id. 
~8 See id. 
~9 See id. 
40 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 34, at 14. 
41 See id.; HANKS, supra note 34, at 3. 
42 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 3. 
4~ See id. at 2. 
44 See id. at 4. 
45 See id. at 3. 
46 See id. 
47 HANKS, supra note 34, at 3. 
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no longer be indentured servants and all Blacks who came to the 
colonies came as slaves.48 
By the Revolutionary War, slavery became accepted as an integral 
part of the colonial economic system.49 There was little organized 
opposition to slavery except by a Quaker group founded in 1688 called 
the "Society of Friends."50 The lack of opposition is ironic: the colonists 
were struggling for their own freedom, yet many owned slaves. 51 
During the Revolutionary War, more than five thousand Black 
soldiers fought in the Continental forces.52 Although colonial freedom 
was won with the aid of Black Americans, they did not achieve their 
own independence from slavery. 55 In fact, in this new nation founded 
on democratic principles and equality, 20% of the entire population 
was enslaved. 54 
The Declaration of Independence was intended to be a "philo-
sophical expression of the democratic ethos on which the Revolution 
was fought .... "55 Yet, the gaps between the ideal and reality become 
obvious when reading passages espousing equality and unalienable 
rights purported by a society with a slave population of 20%.56 Aboli-
tionist leader William Uoyd Garrison later called the hypocrisy within 
the Constitution "a covenant with death and an agreement with helll "57 
Indeed, without the right to freedom and confidence that one's safety 
and security are not constantly in jeopardy, the pursuit of happiness 
becomes difficult, if not impossible. 58 
The apparent contradiction can be reconciled when one consid-
ers that according to the ideology of the day, Blacks were considered 
to be less than human and viewed as "inferior creatures incapable of 
48 See id. at 3-4. Massachusetts was the first colony to legalize slavery in 1641. See ill. at 4. 
Other colonies followed: Connecticut, 1650; Vuginia, 1661; Maryland, 1663; New York and New 
Jersey, 1664; South Carolina, 1682; Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, 1700; North Carolina, 1715; 
and Georgia, 1750. See ill. 
49 See ill. 
50 See id. 
51 See generaU, ill. at 4-5. In fact, a fugitive slave was the first person to die in the Revolutionary 
War. See ill. 
52 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 4-5. 
55 See ill. at 5. 
54 See id. In 1776, the Black population was 570,000 out of a total population of 2,500,000; 
40,000 were ''free persons of color." See ill. 
55Id. at 5. 
56 See id. 
57 ERIC BLACK, OUR CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH THAT BINDS Us 44 (1988). Garrison and his 
followers would not participate in any form of American elections because they believed they 
would be supporting "the pro-slavery, war sanctioning Constitution of the United States." PAUL 
F'INKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 1 (1996). 
58 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 6. 
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handling the responsibility of citizenship."59 This logic was often jus-
tified in Biblical terms: "the Negro was a heathen and barbarian, an 
outcast among peoples of the earth, a descendant of Noah's son Ham, 
cursed by God himself and doomed to be a servant forever on account 
of an ancient sin."60 
Thomas Jefferson, known as "the greatest champion of liberty this 
country has ever had, "61 owned more than 150 slaves.62 Jefferson, a 
founding father of this "free" nation, was unsure about the potential 
for the mental development of Black Americans.63 He had no doubts 
about the present inferiority of Black Americans; however, he was 
unsure if it was a natural consequence or one created by slavery.64 Two 
years before the Constitution was written he wrote: 
Some [Black slaves] have been liberally educated, and all 
have lived in countries where the arts and sciences are culti-
vated to a considerable degree .... But, never yet could I find 
that a [B]lack uttered a thought above the level of narration, 
never see even an elementary trait of painting, or sculp-
ture .... The improvements of the [B]lacks in body and 
mind, in the first instances of their mixture with whites ... 
prove that their inferiority is not the effect merely of their 
condition of life.65 
Following the enactment of the Constitution, Vermont was the 
first state to move towards abolishing slavery.66 In its 1777 state consti-
tution, Vermont allowed slaves to receive their freedom at age twenty-
one for men, and eighteen for women.67 By 1804, slavery was outlawed 
in all the northern states, except Maryland and Delaware.68 Although 
many were free in the North, there was not equality under the law.69 
State statutes did not allow equality in employment, education, hous-
ing, criminal justice, and voting rights.70 
59 [d. at 7. 
60FEHRENBACHER, supra note 34, at 12. 
61 FINKELMAN, supra note 57, at 105 (quoting EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-
AMERICAN FREEDOM 376 (1975». 
62 See id. For a complete history of Thomas Jefferson's ties to slavery, see id. at 105-67. 
65 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 7-8. 
64 See id. at 8. 
65 [d. 
66 See id. at 10. 
67 See id. 
68 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 10. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
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The philosophical tension between the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, state constitutions, and slavery was resolved in the Dred Scott 
decision of 1857.71 Dred Scott was a slave, owned by a military surgeon, 
and brought to a free state where he lived with his wife for four years.72 
Subsequently, Scott went to Missouri, a slave state, and sued for his 
freedom, claiming he and his wife were permanently freed by living 
for so long in a free state.73 The Supreme Court, denying Scott's claim, 
held that the Founding Fathers were not referring to Blacks when they 
used the words "men," "people of the United States," and "citizens."74 
Chief Justice Taney strengthened notions of Black inferiority when he 
concluded Blacks had "no rights which the white man was bound [by 
the law] to respect. "75 
Abraham Lincoln also walked an ideological tightrope during this 
era.76 He professed there was no moral reason why Black Americans 
should not have the inalienable rights guaranteed by the Declaration 
of Independence, while he simultaneously allowed the perpetration of 
white dominance under the law.77 In 1861, Congress passed an amend-
ment to the Constitution that slavery would never be abolished.78 Act-
ing contrary to his stated moral beliefs, President-elect Lincoln en-
dorsed the amendment; he oelieved Congress did not have the legal 
power to abolish slavery.79 Fortunately, the amendment failed to be 
ratified by the States.80 
At the famous Lincoln/Douglas debates Lincoln said: 
I have no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with the 
institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I 
have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do 
so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equal-
ity between the white and [B]lack races .... But I hold that 
not withstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why 
71 See id. at 9. 
72 See BLACK, supra note 57, at 45. For a complete history of the facts of the Dred Scott Case, 
see generally FEHRENBACHER, supra note 34, at 239-448. 
73 See BLACK, supra note 57, at 45. 
74 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 9. 
75Id. The case was decided by a vote of 7-2. See BLACK, supra note 57, at 45. The Scotts were 
later freed by their master and lived in St. Louis where Dred Scott worked as a hotel porter and 
his wife, Harriet, as a laundress. See id. at 46. 
76 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 8. 
77 See id.; BLACK, supra note 57, at 41. 
78 See id.; BLACK, supra note 57, at 41. 
79 See BLACK, supra note 57, at 41. 
80 See id. 
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the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated 
in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.81 
79 
Although Lincoln was relatively progressive for his day, he failed to 
recognize that enslavement and inalienable rights cannot co-exist.82 
Several factors facilitated the movement to illegitimize slavery in-
cluding: (1) white sympathy to freedom in light of their participa-
tion in the Revolutionary War; (2) opinions that slavery was neither 
efficient nor profitable; and (3) beliefs that all races had inalienable 
rights. 811 
When Abraham Lincoln was sworn in as president in 1860, he 
became a national voice for the anti-slavery movement.84 The pro-slav-
ery South seceded because they believed "once in control of the power 
and patronage of the federal government, the anti-slavery forces will 
introduce the debate into the South, build up a party there, set non-
slaveholder against slaveholder, and bring about abolition of slavery by 
the orderly process of state constitutional action. "85 
Historians differ as to the precise reason for the Civil War, which 
lasted from 1861 to 1865.86 There are three primary contributory 
causes: (1) war was forced on the South to abolish slavery; (2) the war 
was a reaction by the South to an overly powerful centralized federal 
government; and (3) the war was due to dissimilar economic structures 
between the North and South.87 Regardless of which was the largest 
stimulant, most historians agree "there would not have been a civil war 
if there had not been slavery. "88 At the conclusion of the Civil War, the 
United States was re-unionized and slavery was legally abolished.89 
B. The Reconstructionist Era 
The Reconstructionist Era began when General Lee surrendered 
to the Union's forces in 1865.90 The Thirteenth Amendment was pass-
81 HANxs, supra note 34, at 8. 
82 See itl. 
lIS See itl. at 10. 
M See itl. at 12. 
85 [d. at 8 (quoting HEmuETTA BUCKMASTER, LET My PEoPLE Go: THE STORY OF THE 
UNDERGROUND RAILROAD AND THE GROWTH OF THE ABOLITIONIST MOVEMENT 132 (1941». 
86 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 8. 
87 See itl. at 11-12. 
88 [d. at 12. 
89 See itl. 
90 See itl. 
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ed that year, which guaranteed freedom from slavery.91 The Military 
Reconstruction Act of 1867 required Southern states to amend their 
constitutions to grant male suffrage, regardless of race, as a condition 
of re-admission to the Union.92 However, Black citizens could vote 
freely in only five New England states-Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.9l1 This amounted to only 6% 
of the national Black population.94 In fact, between 1865 and 1868, 
white voters rejected legislation that would have given Black men the 
right to vote in Connecticut, Wisconsin, Kansas, Ohio, Michigan, and 
NewYork.95 
In order to give Southern Blacks a political weapon to enforce the 
Reconstruction Act, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were 
ratified.96 The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, granted citi-
zenship to "all persons born or naturalized in the United States. "97 The 
Fifteenth, adopted in 1870, provided that "the right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude. "98 In addition, the Enforcement Act of 1870 "provided for 
criminal sanctions against those who interfered with the constitution-
ally guaranteed right to vote. "99 This Act opened the ballot box to Black 
men by prohibiting discriminatory state election laws, and outlawing 
physical threats and intimidation.1OO 
During the early Reconstruction, there was an unprecedented 
period of Black political empowerment and participation.lOl By 1868, 
more than 700,000 Black men were registered to vote.lOl! At the state 
level, where the Black population was high, Black representation was 
high. lOll For example, in the state constitutional conventions, which met 
between 1867-68, there were many Black elected officials. 1M In Ala-
91 See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QuEST FOR VOTING 
EQUALITY 4 (1992). 
92 See id. 
93 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 12. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at 13. 
96 See id. 
97U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 4. 
98U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, § 1; see also GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 5. 
99 GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 5. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. Nationwide voter participation in 1876 was 81.8%. See Rogers, supra note 3, at 11. 
103 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 14. 
104 See id.; see also GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 5. 
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barna, 18 of 108 were Black; in Florida, 18 of 45; in Georgia, 33 of 170; 
in Mississippi, 17 of 100; in Louisiana there was equal representation; 
and in South Carolina there was even a Black majority, 76 of 124.105 
Although there were no Black governors, six lieutenant governors were 
BlackY16 Between 1860 and 1880, a total of sixteen Blacks served in 
Congress (two in the Senate, and fourteen in the House of Repre-
sentatives).107 At this time, about 15% of the officeholders in the South 
were Black-a larger proportion than in 1990.108 
This time period was not only marked by mere numerical pres-
ence, but by tangible accomplishments. 109 Historian Robert C. Gold-
ston recognized the strength of these advancements: 
They [Black elected officials] provided for universal suffrage 
by removing property requirements for voting; abolished the 
medieval system of imprisoning people for debt; abolished 
such cruel and unusual punishment as whipping and brand-
ing; reduced the number of crimes for which a man could be 
executed . . . and established statewide free public school 
systems (the first in Southern history). Although they did not 
redistribute the land, they did pass laws to protect the small 
farmer, and attempted to institute a rational system of taxes. 
Nor were these benefits intended exclusively for Negroes. 
They were vital advantages also to the poor Southern whites. 
In effect, the Reconstruction state governments were attempt-
ing to bring about a peaceful socio-economic revolution in 
Southern society which would have benefited most Southern 
whites as well as Negroes ... .no 
The first Civil Rights Act was passed in 1875.111 It gave Blacks in 
the South many of the rights Black Americans have today.ll2 These 
include an equal right to vote and access to public accommodations. ll3 
Lawrence J. Hanks, an author and advocate of Black political empow-
105 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 14; GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 5. 
106 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 14. 
107 See id. 
108 See BERNARD GROFMAN & CHANDLER DAVIDSON, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 10 
(1992). Of course, a larger percentage of the South was Black in the 1800s. See id. at n.15. 
109 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 14. 
no Id. at 14-15. 
111 See id. at 15. 
112 See id. 
mSeeid. 
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erment, has characterized the Reconstructionist Era as "the apex of 
black political success, and an instance in which the government was 
an instrument of social betterment for [B]lacks ... ,114 [R]ough politi-
cal and social equality was a reality. "115 Unfortunately, these gains to-
ward political and social equality would prove to be short-lived. l16 
C. Losing Gr(JUnd 
Between 1873 and 1876, the Supreme Court destroyed parts of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and declared part of the 
Enforcement Act of 1870 unconstitutional.ll7It would take almost one 
hundred years to overcome these discriminatory rulings. lIS 
In United States v. Reese, the Court overturned the indictments of 
two election officials who had refused to accept the vote of a Black 
citizen in Kentucky, and had been charged with violating provisions of 
the Enforcement Act.119 Provisions of the Enforcement Act were struck 
down as overbroad because they did not confine themselves to dis-
crimination on the basis of race alone, thereby exceeding congres-
sional power.120 The Court stated: 
[The F]ifteenth Amendment extends no positive guarantees 
of the franchise, and does not "confer the right of suffrage 
upon anyone" but merely prohibits both the federal and state 
governments from excluding persons from voting by reason 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude .... 121 Thus, 
there was no positive guarantee of the [B]lack person's right 
to vote.122 
In United States v. Cruishank, eight men were convicted under the 
Enforcement Act for participating in a mob that massacred sixty Blacks 
in Louisiana. 123 They appealed their convictions under Section 6 of the 
114HANKS, supra note 34, at 15. 
115Id. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 16. 
118 See infra notes 179-82, discussing the Voting Rights Act of 1965. For a history of ''Dred 
Scott"-type cases in federal courts, see generally PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, 
FEDERAUSM, AND COMITY 236-84 (1981). 
119 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 6. 
120 See id. at 6-7. 
121 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 16. 
122 See id. 
123 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 7. 
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Enforcement Act, which protected the e~oyment of rights or privileges 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution from conspiracies.124 The Su-
preme Court held that the conspiracy that the defendants were en-
gaged in was aimed at a state right not a federal right, and therefore 
was not subject to federal protection.125 The Court held that the only 
rights the federal government could protect were in federal elections 
and voting free from racial discrimination.126 Chief Justice Morrison R. 
Waite, writing for the Court stated, "[w]e may suspect that race was the 
cause of the hostility; but it was not so averred. "127 Section 6 of the 
Enforcement Act was not actually struck down in Cruishank; however, 
the court's extremely limited interpretation made it virtually worth-
less.128 
The highest court in the United States had interpreted the Act 
that was designed to give teeth to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments in a manner which "crippled the efforts of Congress to protect 
the right to vote against both official and private interference. "129 These 
decisions paralleled a retreat from federal involvement in the voting 
process in the South.130 Left to their own devices, the South would 
promote white supremacy and have nothing to do with voting equal-
ity.131 
In 1868, a Congressional subcommittee collected data that "[o]ver 
2,000 persons were killed, wounded and otherwise injured in [Louisi-
ana] within a few weeks prior to the presidential election; half the State 
was overrun by violence; midnight raids, secret murders, and open riot 
kept the people in constant terror .... "132 This chaos can be attributed 
to the legalization of racial prejudices which were codified during state 
constitutional conventions beginning in the late 1800s. 
D. Southern State Law: Black Disenfranchisement Solidified 
Although many states had enacted statutes designed to reduce the 
number of Blacks eligible to vote, in the 1890s many states held con-
ventions to amend their constitutions in order to prevent any remit-
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 [d. 
128 See id.; HANKS, supra note 34, at 17. 
129GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 7. 
130 See id. 
131 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 17-18. 
152GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 6. 
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tance of Black political influence.133 The leader was Mississippi's state 
constitutional convention in 1890, which enacted the "Mississippi 
Plan "-subsequently adopted by all other Southern states in varying 
degrees. l34 The convention instituted residency requirements of two 
years that would disenfranchise Black sharecroppers;135 certain crimes 
which were believed committed more frequently by Blacks would result 
in disenfranchisement; poll taxes were instituted;136 and registering to 
vote was required four months before an election.137 Mississippi's 
"crowning achievement" was the "understanding clause," which re-
quired a voter to read a section of the state constitution and provide 
a "reasonable" interpretation of any section read to him.138 
These requirements were later amended to further ensure prohi-
bitions against Black men registering to vote, including the require-
ment that citizens "must demonstrate an understanding of the duties 
and obligations of citizenship and possess 'good moral character."'139 
The most devastating aspect of these tests was the broad degree of 
discretion the state-appointed local registration and election officials 
had in evaluating these voting requirements. l40 This discrimination 
resulted in almost complete Black disenfranchisement.141 
For example, former U.S. Representative John H. Buchanan, Jr. 
testified before Congress regarding the overt double standards that 
existed as recently as the late 1940s.142 When he was twenty-one in 
Birmingham, Alabama, he went to the voter office to register for the 
first time.143 He noticed a number of Blacks struggling through the 
ISS See HANKS, supra note 34, at 19. 
1M See id.; see also FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT; POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN 
MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 27 (1990). 
135 See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 377. Sharecroppers were usually hired on a seasonal 
basis, therefore they were more mobile. See id. 
1!16 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 19. For example, in Mississippi, voters had to pay $2 to be 
fully qualified to vote. In many counties, the sheriff would simply refuse to accept payments from 
Blacks. See PARKER, supra note 134, at 28. 
137 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 19. 
138 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 8; HANKS, supra note 34, at 19; PARKER, supra note 134, 
at 27. 
139PARKER, supra note 134, at 27. 
140 See id. at 27-28. State appointment was used to avoid any Black influence in the selection 
of local officials in predominantly Black areas. See id.; see also Purging of Empowerment, supra note 
22, at 485 (citing]. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRIC-
TION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-PARTY SOUTH 1880-1910 48 (1974». 
141 See PARKER, supra note 134, at 27. 
142 See Hearings on Voter Registration Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the House Comm. on 
House Admin., 100th Congo 442-43 (1988) (statement of Hon. John H. Buchanan, former 
Member of Congress) [hereinafter 1988 Hearings]. 
143 See id. at 442. 
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infamous "literacy tests."I44 He picked one up, leafed through the 
complicated questions oflaw, constitutional interpretation, and histori-
cal fact, and knew he could not answer many of the questions. l45 He 
approached the registrar and said he was afraid he would not be able 
to vote because he could not pass the literacy test.146 The registrar 
asked, ''Who was the first President of the United States?" He answered, 
"George Washington. "147 ''You passed," the registrar announced.148 
In Louisiana, in 1867, 84,527 Blacks were registered to vote com-
pared to 45,189 white registered voters.149 Fearful of this power, in 
1898, Louisiana held a constitutional convention with the sole purpose 
to disenfranchise Black voters. 150 As a result, Louisiana contributed the 
"grandfather clause" to the rapidly growing list of disenfranchising 
devices.151 This clause did not actually disenfranchise additional voters, 
but rather it exempted illiterate whites from "literacy tests. "152 The 
Louisiana Constitution provided-"no male, or son or grandson of 
such male, who was entitled to vote onJanuary 1, 1867 [the year prior 
to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment], was to be denied 
the right to vote."153 
In South Carolina, the "Eight Box Laws" were adopted. 154 Eight 
categories of elections were held and each category was given a sepa-
rate ballot bOX.155 Ballots were not counted if they were placed in the 
incorrect box, making it impossible for those who could not read to 
cast ballots.156 In order to ensure that this practice only affected Black 
144 See id.; see also PARKER, supra note 134 (stating literacy tests were the most prominent 
device of Black disenfranchisement, due to the complicated nature of the test and the disqualifica-
tion of Blacks if their responses were not ''letter perfect"). Literacy tests were upheld because "in 
our society where newspapers, periodicals, books and other printed matter canvass and debate 
campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the 
franchise [to vote]." Lassiter v. Northhampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1959). 
145 See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 442 (statement of Hon. John H. Buchanan, former 
Member of Congress). 
146 See id. 
147Id. at 442-43. 
148 Id. 
149 See Purging of Empowerment, supra note 22, at 486 (citing Teachout, Louisiana Underlaw, 
in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 61 (L. Friedman ed., 1965)). 
150 See generally United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 369 (E.D. La. 1963) (tracing the 
history of disenfranchisement of Blacks in Louisiana). 
151 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 9. See United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 369. 
152 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 9. 
15~ Id. 
154 See id. at 7. 
155 See id. at 7-8. 
156 See id. 
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citizens, election officials were instructed to aid only white voters in 
placing ballots in the proper boxes.157 
These practices were subtle compared to the Democratic Party's 
whites-only primary.158 The Democratic Party believed that since it was 
a private organization, it operated outside any constitutional require-
ments.159 Therefore, the Party could actively discriminate if it desired. l60 
The whites-only primaries, instituted across the South, held that only 
whites were eligible for party membership and permitted to nominate 
party candidates.161 
In Williams v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court once again rein-
forced disenfranchisement by upholding these types of voter registra-
tion limitations.162 In Williams, a Black man was convicted of murder 
by an all white jury that was chosen from the voter registration rolls. 
The rolls virtually excluded the Black population.163 The Court held 
that the defendant's due process of law was not violated by the mere 
existence of these various requirements (understanding tests, poll 
taxes, lengthy residency requirements, etc.).164 The Court concluded 
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment existed because, "[the 
voting laws] do not on their face discriminate between the races, and 
it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only 
that evil was possible under them. "165 
With the Court's opinions in hand, many Southern whites began 
a virtual war against the political power of Black Americans.166 Secret 
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan began to swell in numbers.167 
During the 1890s, there was an average of 154 lynchings per year, all 
in the South, and all the victims were Black.168 
By the 1900s Black Americans in the South were practically ex-
cluded from the voting process.169 The Federal Government had lost 
157 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 8. 
158 See id. at 9. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 8. 
16S See id. at 10. 
164 See id. 
165Id. 
166 See Don Edwards, The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: 
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 3-4 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985). 
167 See id. 
168 See id. at 4. 
169 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 10. 
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its power to ensure political equality for Blacks, states had erected every 
barrier possible to Black voters, and the Supreme Court had affirmed 
the existence of such barriers.17o This would not change in any meas-
urable fashion until 1965.171 
E. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 
A series of civil rights acts were passed in the 1950s and early 
1960s.172 However, they did little to remove Black voter registration 
barriers in the South.17ll Following the enactment of these civil rights 
acts, Louisiana registration of voting-age Blacks crept from 31.7% to 
31.8% between 1956 and 1965. In Mississippi, it increased from 4.4% 
to only 6.4% between 1954 and 1964.174 In early 1965, Mississippi's 
population was 42% Black, but the only recorded Black officials in the 
entire state were the mayor and city council of the all-Black Delta town 
of Mound Bayou.175 
In contrast, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 removed all active 
barriers that restricted Black voting access and returned substance to 
the Fifteenth Amendment.176 However, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
was originally met with a great deal of opposition from Southern 
congressmen and conservative Northerners.177 Don Edwards, a mem-
ber of the House Committee on the Constitution and Civil Rights, 
believes that Southerners were terrified that the influx of millions of 
Black voters would "tip the balance of political power in many fiefdoms 
controlled for a hundred years by whites. "178 However, this resistance 
was replaced with rage after the murder of Viola Liuzzo, a white 
middle<lass mother from Michigan, who was shot from a passing car 
170 See ill. 
171 See ill. 
1'12 See ill. at 12. 
175 See ill. at 12-15. 
174 See GROFMAN, supra note 91, at 15; see also Purging of Empowerment, supra note 22, at 488 
(stating the Civil Rights Act of 1957 had large loopholes and did not facilitate the registration of 
any Blacks who were not already registered). 
175 See PARKER, supra note 1M, at 28-29. 
176 See ill. at 29-80. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a ~or achievement; however, 
Southern Whites realized that while they could not deny Blacks the right to vote, they could 
reduce the impact of Black voters. This was done largely through at-large and multi-member 
districts, gerrymandering, and by changing some offices from elective to appointive. See Eddie 
N. William, Fureword to FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES CoUNT; POLITICAL EMpOWERMENT IN 
MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 XV (1990). 
177 See Edwards, supra note 166, at 5. 
17S/d. 
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by a Ku Klux Klan member as she worked a voter registration table in 
Alabama.179 The Act, called "the most effective piece of civil rights 
legislation ever passed by Congress," was signed into law on August 6, 
1965.1s0 
The Act instantly brought a halt to the use of historically racist 
voter registration devices, such as the literacy tests. lSI Congress created 
oversight measures to assure that states would not design creative new 
discriminatory devices.1s2 Section 5 of the Act required the U.S. Attor-
ney General or U.S. Court of Appeals to approve all proposed changes 
to a state's existing voting laws in order to ensure it would not discrimi-
nate against minorities.1S3 Gerrymandering suits could be brought un-
der section 2 of the Act, which broadly prohibited any voting proce-
dure that denied or abridged the right to vote.l84 
Black voter registration exploded.1s5 In the South by 1969, one 
million new Black voters were registered, resulting in a dramatic inc-
rease in the percentage of eligible Black voters from 35.5% to 64.8%.lS6 
In Mississippi, from 1964 to 1976, Black voter registration increased 
from 29,000 to 286,000-an increase of 886.2%.187 Consequently, while 
fewer than 300 Blacks held offices in Southern states before the Act, 
the figure was over 2,000 by 1980.188 
However, all voter registration obstacles were not yet removed.189 
Procedural barriers such as inconvenient registration sites, unrealistic 
site hours, and a lack of deputy registrars, accounted for a stall in the 
drive towards voting equality.190 Due to these and other voter registra-
tion obstacles, Black voting participation rates still significantly lacked 
179 See id. 
180 Id.; see also HANKS, supra note 34, at 33. For an analysis of the first two decades of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, see generally ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHO'S VOTE COUNTS? (1987); 
LoRN S. FOSTER, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS (1985). 
181 See Edwards, supra note 166, at 5. For new tactics of dilution, see PARKER, supra note 134, 
at 29-33. 
182 See Edwards, supra note 166, at 5. 
18S See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 35; Edwards, supra note 166, at 5. 
186 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 35; Edwards, supra note 166, at 5. 
187 See Edwards, supra note 166, at 5. For detailed registration figures in Mississippi between 
1964 and 1980, see PARKER, supra note 134, at 31. 
188 See HANKS, supra note 34, at 35. 
189 See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 224-25 (1988) (statement of Arthur S. Flemming, 
Chairman, Citizens' Comm. on Civil Rights & William L. Taylor, Member, Comm. of the Citizens' 
Comm. on Civil Rights). 
190 See id. at 224. 
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proportionality.l9l For example, in the 1984 presidential elections, 
61.4% of the white voting-age population participated, compared to 
only 55.8% of the eligible Black voting-age population.192 
Until the National Voter Registration Act, also known as the Motor 
Voter Registration Act, the antiquated registration laws of exclusion 
still plagued Black Americans.193 The Motor Voter Registration Act, 
which was signed into law by President Clinton on May 20,1993,194 and 
made mandatory to the states on January 1,1995, attempted to reduce 
many of the existing voting barriers.195 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MOTOR VOTER 
REGISTRATION ACT 
The Motor Voter Registration Act was enacted to eliminate restric-
tive voting registration barriers which have disproportionately harmed 
Black Americans' voter participation due to a history of political dis-
enfranchisement.196 However, the Act was passed into law only after 
years of bitter controversy.197 Although it was signed into law in 1993, 
debate regarding shifting the onus of voter registration from the indi-
vidual to the government began in the early 1970s.198 
191 See id. at 224-25. For data on the disproportionate numbers of Blacks elected in Missis-
sippi, see PARKER, supra note 134, at 32. 
192 See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 224-25. 
193NVRA, supra note 30, §§ 1973gg(a), (b). 
194Id. 
195 See generaUy id. 
196 Id. § 1973gg(a)(3). 
197 See supra notes 177, 191. 
198 These bills, which advocated more inclusive registration laws, either never reached a vote 
or were defeated. See, e.g., Universal Voter Registration Act of 1977, S. 1072, 95th Congo (1977) 
(attempted to establish universal voter registration program); Universal Voter Registration Act of 
1977, H.R. 5400, 95th Congo (1977) (same); Voter Registration Act, H.R. 11552, 94th Congo 
(1976) (established Voter Registration Administration in the Federal Election Commission for 
the purpose of administering a program through the Postal Service); Voter Registration Act, S. 
1177, 94th Congo (1975) (amended 13 U.S.C. to establish within the Census Bureau a Voter 
Registration Administration for the purpose of administering a voter registration program 
through the Postal Service); States Voter Registration Act, H.R. 6079, 94th Congo (1975) (amend-
ing the Federal Election Commission Act of 1971 to establish within the Federal Election Com-
mission a Voter Registration Bureau for the purpose of assisting states in improving voter regis-
tration programs); Voter Registration Act, H.R. 4093, 94th Congo (1975) (amending 13 U.S.C. to 
establish within the Census Bureau a Voter Registration Administration for the purpose of 
administering a national voter registration program through the Postal Service); Voter Registra-
tion Act, H.R. 1686, 94th Cong. (1975) (establishing a Voter Registration Administration in the 
General Accounting Office for the purpose of administering a voter registration program through 
the Postal Service); Voter Registration Assistance Act of 1973, S. 472, 93d Congo (1973) (amending 
13 U.S.C. to establish a Voter Registration Administration in the Census Bureau to carry out a 
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A. The Journey Begins 
Of the numerous proposals of the 1970s, the only one to reach 
the floor in both congressional houses was a post card registration 
system introduced by Senator Gale McGee (D_wy}.199 The Senator 
proposed the use of a simplified registration form, a post card, to be 
sent to an individual's residence and available at the post office.20o A 
portion of the card was kept as a receipt, and cards were not to be 
forwarded if someone moved.201 To prevent fraud, the signature on the 
card would be verified at the polls.202 There was a requirement to 
register thirty days before the election to allow election officials to 
program of financial assistance to the states to encourage and assist voter registration); Voter 
Registration Act, S. 352, 93d Congo (1973) (amending 13 U.S.C. to establish a Voter Registration 
Administration in the Census Bureau for the purpose of administering a voter registration 
program through the Postal Service); Voter Registration Act, H.R. 8053, 93d Congo (1973) (same); 
National Registration Rights Act of 1973, H.R. 4846, 93d Congo (1973) (amending the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 to safeguard the constitutional and civil liberties of American citizens with 
regard to lawful guarantees of participation in the democratic process); Voter Registration Act, 
H.R. 580, 93d Congo (1973) (amending 13 U.S.C. to establish within the Census Bureau a National 
Voter Registration Administration for the purpose of administering a voter registration program 
through the Postal Service); Voter Registration Assistance Act of 1972, s. 3420, 92d Congo (1972) 
(amending 13 U.S.C. to establish a Voter Registration Administration in the Census Bureau to 
carry out a program of financial assistance to the states to encourage and assist voter registration); 
National Voter Registration Act, S. 2574, 92d Congo (1971) (amending 13 U.S.C. to establish in 
the Census Bureau a National Voter Registration Administration for the purpose of a voter 
registration program through the mail); Universal Voter Registration for Federal Elections, S. 
2457, 92d Congo (1971) (establishing a system of universal registration for federal elections); 
National Federal Voter Registration Act of 1971, S. 2445, 92d Cong. (1971) (providing for 
nationwide registration of voters for federal offices); Universal Enrollment Act of 1971, S. 1199, 
92d Congo (1971) (amending 13 U.S.C. allowing for the Census Bureau to undertake a quadren-
nial enrollment of voters for presidential elections who met all state qualifications except resi-
dency); Canvass of the Election Process, H.R. 12016, 92d Congo (1971) (amending 13 U.S.C. to 
have Census Bureau establish a program of electoral canvassing); Voter Rights Act Amendments 
of 1971, H.R. 10442, 92d Congo (1971) (establishing a system of automatic voter registration); 
Universal Enrollment Act of 1971, H.R. 6088, 92d Congo (1971) (amending 13 U.S.C. for Census 
Bureau to undertake a quadrennial enrollment of voters for presidential elections who meet all 
state qualifications except residency); Universal Enrollment Act of 1970, S. 4238, 9Ist Congo 
(1970) (amending 13 U.S.C. by authorizing the Secretary of Commerce through the Census 
Bureau to undertake a quadrennial enrollment of those persons that meet the qualifications of 
the various states other than residency for presidential elections); Universal Enrollment Act of 
1970, H.R. 19010, 91st Congo (1970) (same). Mark Thomas Quinlivan, One Person, One Vote 
Revisited: The Impending Necessity of Judicial Intervention in the Realm of Voter Registration, 137 U. 
PA. L. REv. 2361, 2388-89, n.172 (1989). 
199 See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 195. At this time only three states had experimented 
with some form of post card registration (Texas, California, and Kentucky). See id. at 195-96. 
200 See id. at 195. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
1998] MOTOR VOTER ACT 91 
check fraudulent forms and compile a federal register. 203 The bill 
passed the Senate by twenty votes, but failed in the House by seven 
votes.204 
In the 1986 mid-term elections, voter participation was a dismal 
37.2%, and in the 1988 presidential elections it was only 50.1 %.205 
Ninety million Americans did not vote in the 1988 election.206 It was 
the lowest voter turnout rate since 1924.207 Senator Edward Kennedy 
(D-MA) stated that "[i]n one survey, 37 percent of non-voters said they 
could not vote because they were not registered and two-thirds of that 
group said they would have voted if they were registered. "208 Almost 
70% of these non-voters cited the burden imposed by mechanical 
procedures for their failure to register.209 These restrictive registration 
procedures have a disproportionate negative impact on "minorities 
who have suffered most from discrimination. "210 Senator Kennedy con-
tinued: 
[I]n 20 of 28 states for which the Census Bureau maintains 
separate data by race, [B]lack registration trails white regis-
tration by an average of almost 9 percentage points, and 
numerous studies indicate that the discriminatory impact is 
actually worse because [B]lacks are more likely than whites 
to over-report being registered.211 
As a result of these horrifYing statistics, the "National Voter Regis-
tration Act of 1989" ("H.R. 2190") was introduced and debated before 
the House.212 H.R. 2190 was established to ease the burden of voter 
registration by standardizing the registration procedures for federal 
205 See id. 
204 See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 195. 
205 SEE POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 8, at 5. 
206 See Equal Access to Voting Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 675 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. 
ofthe Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Congo 31 (1989) (statements of Hon. Cranston) [hereinafter 
Hearings on S. 67..5]. This is an increase of 10 million over the last presidential election. See id. 
207 See Richard L. Berke, 50.16% Voter Turnout Was Lowest Since 1924, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
1988, at A36. 
20S Hearings on S. 675, supra note 206, at 21 (statements of Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
209 See Squire, supra note 33, at 232. People cited the following reasons for not registering: 
recently moved and did not re-register (47%), worked during registration hours (11 %), did not 
know how to register (6%), registration offices too far from home (3%), did not register because 
not interested in politics (17%). See id. 
210 Hearings on S. 675, supra note 206, at 21 (statements of Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
2ll [d. 
2l2H.R 2190, lOIst Congo (1989). A number of similar bills were introduced in the 100th 
and lOIst Congresses, none reached the floor of either the House or the Senate. See, e.g., 
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offices, thereby increasing the number of registered voters.213 The bill 
contained three major provisions: (1) driver's licenses shall serve as 
voter registration applications if the individual does not dedine;214 (2) 
eligible individuals may mail in voter registration cards without the 
requirement of notarization;215 and (3) agency-based registration shall 
be available in fishing and hunting bureaus, public assistance centers, 
post offices, and unemployment offices. 216 In addition, states would de-
signate additional offices to distribute and accept completed forms. 217 
As with previous registration reforms, H.R. 2190 was strongly op-
posed by many House members.218 In addition, President Bush believed 
that the bill would be extremely costly and subject to instances of 
fraud. 219 However, the House overcame Republican opposition and 
President Bush's veto threat, and passed H.R. 2190 on February 6, 
1990, by a final vote of 289-132.220 
Universal Voter Registration Act of 1988, S. 2061, 100th Congo (1988) (establishing national 
standards for elections for federal offices); Universal Voter Registration Act of 1988, H.R. 3950, 
100th Congo (1988); Universal Voter Registration Act of 1987, S. 1888, 100th Congo (1987); Voter 
Registration Act of 1987, S. 1405, 100th Congo (1987) (amending 39 U.S.C. to provide that 
change-of-address forms submitted to the Postal Service be furnished to the appropriate authority 
for voter registration purposes); Universal Voter Registration Act of 1987, H.R. 3666, 100th Congo 
(1987) (establishing national standards for voter registration); Voter Participation Act of 1987, 
H.R. 3023, 100th Congo (1987) (providing for election day and mail registration for federal 
elections); Voter Registration Act, H.R. 2750, 100th Congo (1987) (amending 39 U.S.C. to provide 
that change-of-address forms submitted to the Postal Service be furnished to the appropriate state 
authority for voter registration purposes); Voter Registration Act of 1985, S. 1439, 99th Congo 
(1985); Postage Free Election Material, S. 1420, 99th Congo (1985) (amending 39 U.S.C. to 
provide that voter registration forms, among others, be mailed by election agencies free of 
postage); Free Postage Election Participation Act, H.R. 2216, 99th Congo (1985) (amending 39 
U.S.C. to provide that voter registration forms, among others, be mailed by election agencies free 
of postage); Voter Registration Act of 1985, H.R. 1668, 99th Congo (1985) (amending 39 U.S.C. 
to provide that change-of-address forms submitted to the Postal Service be furnished to the 
appropriate state authority for voter registration purposes); Registration Deadline Elimination 
Act of 1985, H.R. 1454, 99th Cong. (1985) (protecting the voting rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by preventing inappropriate registration procedures); 
Postcard Registration Act of 1985, H.R. 1453, 99th Congo (1985) (protecting voting rights by 
eliminating certain barriers to participation in federal elections). Quinlivan, supra note 198, at 
2388 n.17l. 
213 See H.R. REp. No. 101-243, at 7 (1990). 
214 See itt. § 103. 
215 See itt. § 104; under penalty of perjury. 
216 See itt. § 105. 
217 See id. 
218 See Senate Republicans KiU 'Motur Voter' Bill, CONGo Q. ALMANAC, 101st Congo 2d Sess., at 
71 (1990). 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 72. 
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On May 1, 1989, Senator Wendall Ford (D-KY) sponsored the 
Senate's companion bill, S. 874. Due to amendments, S. 874 differed 
from H.R 2190 in the following respects: (1) it contained no provision 
for removing the names of registered voters from the rolls, leaving it 
to the states; (2) it provided that the Federal Election Commission have 
a regulatory role in voter participation; and (3) it did not authorize 
any federal funds. 221 
On September 26, 1990, the Senate debated the bill and voted to 
cease floor debate in order to allow a final vote for passage.222 Sixty 
votes were needed for closure; however, the motion fell five votes 
short.225 Therefore, the bill died in the Senate without ever receiving 
an actual vote for passage.224 
Senator Ford was not discouraged by yet another Congressional 
failure to pass voter registration reform. On January 31, 1991, he 
introduced the National Voter Registration Act of 1991, S. 250.225 The 
bill, nicknamed the "Motor Voter Bill," would enable people to register 
to vote when applying for or renewing a driver's license, by an appli-
cation through the mail or in person at designated federal, state, or 
non-governmentallocations.226 It was estimated the bill would increase 
the eligible voter registration rate from 60% to 90%.227 
In March and April of 1991, the Senate Rules and Administration 
Committee debated the bill.228 Although the bill represented the great-
est move towards voting equality since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
there were still major criticisms, such as a lack offederal funds to offset 
the cost to counties229 and increased voting fraud. 230 However, these 
concerns were offset by the potential gains from including millions 
more in the democratic process, and S. 250 passed the Senate on May 
21, 1992.251 The House agreed upon S. 250 on June 16, 1992.252 
221 See Voter RBgistration, 69 CONGo DIG. 98, 107 (Apr. 1990). 
222 See Senate RBpublicans KiU 'Motor Voter' Bill, supra note 218, at 72. 
225 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 8.250, 102d Cong. (1991). 
226 137 CONGo REc. 81086 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1991). 
H7 See 137 CoNG. REc. 811534 (daily ed.July 31,1991). 
228 See grmerally 8. REp. No. 102-60 (1991). 
2~See69 CONGo DIG. 127 (Apr. 1990). 
250 See 8. REp. No. 102-60, at 3 (1991). 
231 See 138 CONGo REc. H3680 (daily ed. May 21, 1992). 
252 See H.R. Res. 480, 102d Congo (1992), cited in 138 CONGo REc. H4702 (daily ed.June 16, 
1992). 
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The victory was short lived when President George Bush vetoed 
the legislation onJuly 2, 1992.21111 The President called the bill "an open 
invitation to fraud and corruption. "284 The Senate tried to override the 
veto and save this valuable piece of legislation, but failed. 2115 Senator 
Ford, a long time supporter of registration reform legislation, said, "I 
do not understand why the Republican side of the aisle is so vehe-
mentlyopposed [to allowing] people to reconnect with their govern-
ment."236 
B. The Thter Registration Act of 1993 
When President William Jefferson Clinton was elected to the ex-
ecutive office, new hope for the passage of the "Motor Voter" legisla-
tion was born.237 The Voter Registration Act of 1993 (H.R. 2) was 
considered in the House and passed on February 4, 1993.2118 The House 
bill passed with a strong vote of 249-170.2119 
The same bill was introduced into the Senate (S. 460) on March 
10, 1993.240 However, due to Republican opposition, floor debate and 
back-door meetings among party leaders ensued.241 The Republican 
party opposition stuck together, threatening a filibuster that would kill 
the bill once again.242 
One of the principle compromises, offered in an effort to appease 
the Republican party leaders, was that a state "may" provide registra-
tion forms at public assistance offices.243 This altered the earlier version 
that would have made the existence of forms at unemployment offices, 
welfare offices, and agencies which assist the disabled, mandatory.244 
2M See 138 CoNG. REc. S9772 (daily ed.July 2, 1992) (presidential veto message). 
2MId. 
2M See 138 CoNG. REc. SI4616-19 (dailyed. Sept. 22, 1992). 
2llS See Chuck Alston, Democrats Flex New Muscle Wuh Trio of Election Bills, CONGo Q. ALMANAC, 
Mar. 20, 1993 (alteration in original). 
237 See GoodlJye Gridlock, Hello Steamroller, 'liME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 11. The NVRA was passed 
largely due to the two year period from 1993-95 during which the Democrats occupied both 
houses of Congress and the White House. See id.; see also S. REp. No. 103-06, at 50-57 (1993) 
(stating minority views). 
2SS See 139 CONGo REc. H505 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993). 
2S9 See id. 
240 See S. 460, 103d Cong., 139 CONGo REc. S2576 (1993). 
241 See Richard Sammon, Senate Approves "Motor Voter" With Concessions to the GOP, CONGo 
Q. WKLY. REp., Mar. 20,1993, at 664 [hereinafter Sammon, Senate Approves "Motor Voterj. 
242 See id. The Democrats had 57 Senators; therefore, they needed the support of 3 Repub-
licans to gain the 60 votes needed for closure on the bill. See id. 
2411 See id. 
244 See id. 
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Prior to the change in this one word, the bill failed.245 On March 16, 
the bill fell one vote shy of the 60 votes required for closure due to a 
Republican filibuster.246 The Republicans maintained that requiring 
voter registration at public assistance agencies would result in citizens 
"feel[ing] pressured into registering to vote before asking for benefit 
checks or other forms of help. "247 
Democratic leaders called the original provision a great way to 
include citizens who might be left out because they do not own cars.24B 
Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-ME), called the dispute "pa-
thetic," stating "they [Republicans] don't have enough confidence in 
their own candidates and their own positions, so they try to prevent 
the registration of more voters. "249 Edward A. Hailes, counsel for the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, called 
the modification "disastrous" and that "[w]e cannot support this bill 
now. No way."250 
At a House-Senate Conference, Senator Dave Durenberger of 
Minnesota offered alternative language that would appease both sides 
on this provision. ~l The language required "public agencies to make 
it clear to beneficiaries of public assistance that registering to vote is 
entirely optional and that not registering will not affect the amount of 
assistance one receives. "252 However, the final conference bill omitted 
unemployment benefit agencies as required registration cites.25!l 
The House voted 259-164 to adopt the conference report on the 
bill on May 5, 1993.254 The Senate voted on May 11, 1993, to accept 
24!i See id. 
246 See Sammon, Senate Approves "Motor Voter,· supra note 241, at 664. The final vote was 
59-41. See id. 
247 Richard Sammon, Negotiations Begin on "Motor Voter, • CONGo Q. WKLY. REp., Apr. 3, 1993, 
at 837. 
248 See id. 
249 Sammon, Senate Approves "Motor Voter, • supra note 241, at 664. 
150 [d. 
251 See Richard Sammon, Deal May Speed Up "Motor Voter, • CoNG. Q. WKLY. REp., May I, 1993, 
at 1080. 
252 [d. This language was offered to attract enough Republican Senators to reach the needed 
60 votes and pass the measure. See id. Conferences also dropped language written by Sen. Alan 
Simpson (R-WY.) that would have enabled states to selectively require documentation of citizen-
ship upon request. See id. This was believed to result in discrimination against voters who have 
foreign or foreign sounding names. See id. 
2M See 139 CONGo REc. H2264 (dailyed. May 5, 1993); Richard Sammon, House OKs "Motor 
Voter" Fur Final Senate Voter, CONGo Q. WK. REp., May 8, 1993, at 1144 [hereinafter Sammon, 
House OKs "Motor Voteri. 
254 See Sammon, Hoose OKs "Motor Voter, • supra note 253, at 1144. 
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the House-Senate compromised bill, 62-36.255 Six Republicans joined 
the fifty-six Democrats on the final bill, two more than needed to avoid 
the filibuster.256 The bill was signed by President Clinton on May 20, 
1993.257 
Some states were reluctant to institute the program.258 Resistance 
was based on the imposition of unfunded federal mandates challenged 
under Article 10 of the Constitution,259 as infringing upon the sover-
eign independence of state agencies.260 Six states, California,261 Pennsyl-
vania, Illinois, South Carolina, Michigan, and Virginia, initially blocked 
the Act's implementation and accordingly were sued by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice for non-compliance. Today, the constitutional de-
bate has largely ended because in all six cases the NVRA was upheld 
by federal district courts, and two of the cases were affirmed by federal 
appellate courts.262 
The NVRA was required to be implemented by all states in Federal 
elections by January 1, 1996.263 Therefore, the presidential election in 
1996 provides the first data on the impact of the Act on the desired 
end- increased voter participation for all Americans. 
IV. MEASURING THE ACT'S SUCCESS 
Since the passage of the "Motor Voter Act," opposition has con-
tinued.264 A group of Republican senators have targeted the law for 
removal,265 Two bills were introduced in 1994 attempting to repeal the 
NVRA.266 Therefore, successful registration rates combined with higher 
voter participation would anchor the law as solid policy. 
255 See id. 
256 See id. The Republican Senators were Dave Durenburger (MN), Mark O. Hatfield (OR) 
(a co-sponsor of the bill); Arlen Specter (PA); James M. Jeffords (VI); Pete V. Domenici (NM) 
and Bob Packwood (OR). William Cohen (ME) voted for closure on the bill but against the final 
measure. Bob Packwood did not vote for closure but voted for the final bill. See id. 
257 See Act of May 20,1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, lO7 Stat. 77 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg). 
258 See generally Kevin K. Green, A Vote Properly Cast? The Constitutionality of the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993, 22]. LEGIS. 45 (1996) (evaluating the constitutional challenges to NVRA). 
259 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
260 See generally Green, supra note 258. 
261 See generally Wilson v. United States, 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995). 
262 See Green, supra note 258, at 50. 
263 See NVRA, supra note 30, at § 1973gg. 
264 See Richard Sammon, Senators Strike at Motor-Voter Law, CONGo Q. WKLY. REp., Jan. 14, 
1995, at 151 [hereinafter Sammon, Senators Strike at Motor-Voter Law]. However, there is specu-
lation that President Clinton would veto any attempt to overturn the law. See id. 
265 See id. 
266 See S. 218, 104th Congo (1995); H.R. 370, 104th Congo (1995). 
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A. Election Data 
Although there have been millions of individuals added to the 
registration rolls, actual participation rates have been disappointing.267 
In 1994, only 37% of the eligible Blacks voted compared to 47% of 
whites.268 On January 1, 1996, the law was made mandatory on the 
states.269 Approximately twenty million Americans registered to vote or 
updated their registration between 1995 and June 1996, and nine 
million of the first time regis trees were Black.270 Yet, only 48.8% of the 
voting age population voted in the 1996 presidential election.271 It was 
the lowest turnout in any election since 1924, and the second lowest 
since 1824 in a presidential election.272 
Democratic pollster Celinda Lake said turnout was actually down 
among young and minority voters.273 Fifty-one percent of whites par-
ticipated in the election compared to only 35% of Blacks.274 Between 
1992 and 1996, Black male voters increased from 3.1 million to 4.8 
million (from 3% to 5% of the electorate); yet, the number of Black 
women voters fell from 5.1 million to 4.8 million (remaining at 5%) .275 
Political scientist Curtis Gans said, "[T]he ease of registration can only 
create the opportunity to vote. "276 He noted, "voting, on the other 
hand, depends on motivation, which has been increasingly lacking. "277 
Florida provides a microcosm of the national problem of low 
participation rates.278 Only half of its registered voters have voted in 
the last five presidential elections.279 In Florida, there are several rea-
267 See infra notes 270-72. 
268 See Minorities Take Leave of Democracy, supra note 26, at B2. 
269 See NVRA, supra note 30. 
270 See Vic Ostrowidzki, Low Voter Turnout StiU a Problem, TIMES UNION, Nov. 3, 1996, at E6. 
Data is based on a study by SERVE, a New York group that promotes voter participation. See ill.; 
see also Charmagne Helton & Lucy Soto, Democrats Counting Heavily on Black Vote; The ''Motur 
Voter" Law is Expected to Increase Minority Turnout This Year, ATLANTA]. & CONST., Nov. 4, 1996, 
at 3B. 
271 See Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Experts Spread the Blame fur Law Turnout, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
Nov. 8, 1996, at A4. 
272 See id. 
275 See ill.; see also Minorities Take Leave of Democracy, supra note 26 (stating the 1994 Black 
participation rate was 37%). 
274 See Minzesheimer, supra note 28, at 4A. In 1992, 67.6% of whites voted, 48% of Blacks, 
and 28.9% of Hispanics. See Ostrowidzki, supra note 270, at E6. 
275 See Jonathan Tilove, U.S. Black Men Find Power of the Polls; Unprecedented Voter Turnout 
Linked to Million Man March, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 5,1996, at A33. 
276 O'Rourke, supra note 271, at A4. 
277Id. 
278 See Gerald Shields, Decision Time is Here; Voting is Not Very Popular in Flmida, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1996, at AI. 
279 See ill. 
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sons for voter apathy.280 "One reason is its transient population. An-
other is its more stringent voter registration deadlines. And third is its 
history of disenfranchisement among minority voters. "281 
There are alternative registration programs, used by numerous 
states, that have consistently had higher voter participation rates than 
the national system.282 In the 1996 presidential elections, Maine had 
the highest turnout nationwide with 64%, followed by Minnesota at 
62.9%, and Montana at 62.6%.283 Not surprisingly, these states have 
more liberal voter registration laws than is mandated by "Motor 
Voter. "284 Minnesota, Wisconsin, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Maine 
allow voter registration on election day itself, and North Dakota re-
quires no voter registration at all. 285 
V. INCREASING VOTER REGISTRATION AND PARTICIPATION 
At a recent forum on minority voting at Virginia Union University, 
the sparse audience of approximately two dozen spoke volumes about 
the problem of minority political participation even with NVRA.286 ''We 
[minority voters] have a voice if we use it," said Roxie Raines Kornegay, 
executive director of the Virginia Council on Human Rights.287 ''We 
exclude ourselves from the table simply because we do not use the 
voice we have."288 Robert Holsworth, a Virginia political scientist, con-
ducted a study that found "four of Richmond's [Virginia] nine wards 
have voter registration rates below 50 percent, an alarming fact that 
reflects disengagement from the political arena. "289 
As previously cited, there have been numerous voter registration 
programs proposed over the years.290 For example, in 1989, Congress 
proposed H.R. 17 which would have entirely removed voter pre-regis-
tration requirements for federal elections by allowing election-day reg-
280 See id. 
281 [d. 
282 See O'Rourke, supra note 271, at A4. 
283 See id. 
284 See Ostrowidzki, supra note 270, at E6. 
285 See id. 
286 See Christine Neuberger, F(JT'um on Minmty Voting Pawer Sees Much Apathy, Great Potentia~ 
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1996, at B1. 
287Id. 
288Id. 
289 Id. 
290 See text accompanying supra notes 198, 212. 
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istration.29l The Act would significantly benefit racial minorities' voter 
registration and participation rates.292 
A. Election-Day Registration 
Almost all states have a closing date for voter registration-a set 
date before an election that is the last day an eligible party can regis-
ter.29g This has been deemed the most important variable in reconciling 
different voting rates between the states.294 The likelihood that an 
individual will vote is directly related to one's motivation to vote and 
the costs associated with it.295 Therefore, the "easier it is for a person 
to cast a ballot,the more likely he is to vote."296 Generally, the closer a 
closing date is to the actual election day, the higher the voter turn-
out.297 This is illustrated by states that allow registration on election day 
(Maine, Minnesota, Wisconsin), or no registration at all (North Da-
kota), having voter turnout percentages twelve points higher than the 
rest of the country.298 
Election day registration allows eligible citizens to register when 
their interest is at its peak.299 For instance, during the last month of a 
campaign, advertising and debates usually begin intensifying over the 
last two weeks.3°O During this period an individual's awareness is at its 
maximum.30l However, those that have become interested at this point 
have missed the registration deadline.302 Therefore, there is no corre-
lation between the degree of stimulation and voter participation.303 
291 See Universal Voter Registration Act of 1989, H.R. 17, 101st Congo (1989) (introduced by 
Rep. Conyers). 
292 Since this Note is premised on the conclusion that Black Americans are disproportionately 
disadvantaged due to restrictive registration laws, it follows that any liberalization would have a 
greater proportionate effect on them. 
29~ See Squire, supra note 33, at 232-33. 
294 See id. at 233. 
295 See RAYMOND WOLFINGER AND STEPHEN ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 8 (1987) cited in 1988 
Hearings, supra note 142, at 439 (statement by Rep. Hamilton Fish,Jr., D-NY). 
296 [d. 
297 See id. 
29S See Squire, supra note 33, at 234. Squire provides a complete listing of states with dosing 
dates and voter turnout rates during the 1988 election. See id. In 1988, the four states had a mean 
voter turnout of 62%. The national average was 50.2%. See id. 
299 See 1989 Hearings, supra note 22, at 138 (remarks of Jesse Jackson, President, National 
Rainbow Coalition). 
~oo See id. 
~OI See id. 
~02 See id. 
M~See id. 
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The "Universal Voter Registration Act of 1989," which would have 
instituted election-day registration nationwide, was written in part be-
cause "restrictions on the ability to register have disproportionately 
harmed voter participation by various groups, including racial minori-
ties."304 In fact, one Congressman even went so far as to call it "a civil 
rights bill. "305 
Rainbow Coalition President Jesse Jackson believes same-day reg-
istration ''would remove the single greatest barrier to voting in our 
Nation [pre-registration]; [and] for the first time in our Nation's his-
tory, breathe life into the one person, one vote concept upon which 
our democratic society stands, "306 and that the Voting Rights Act itself 
was "incomplete" without election-day registration.307 
The Committee for the Study of the American Electorate con-
ducted a study, commissioned by the Ford Foundation, titled "Creating 
the Opportunity. "308 It evaluated how various changes in voter laws 
would affect registration and turnout by comparing substantive chan-
ges in state law to the voting data in subsequent years.309 The study 
estimated that nationally instituted election-day registration would im-
pact actual turnout in presidential elections by an increase of 6,252,000 
voters.310 This was the greatest impact of any change in the registration 
law evaluated, largely because it removes two major voting barriers. 311 
It eliminates any time gap between the act of registration and voting, 
and it makes voting a one-step rather than a two-step process.312 
The study also evaluated the two major provisions of the "motor 
voter" legislation; driver's license registration and mail-in registra-
tion.313 It was estimated that voter registration would increase by 
5,785,000 for license registration and 570,000 for mail-in registration. 314 
304H.R 17, supra note 291, at § 2(5). 
305 1989 Hearings, supra note 22, at 137 (remarks by Rep. Al Swift, Chairman of the Sub-
comm.). 
306Id. at 136 (remarks of Jesse Jackson, President, National Rainbow Coalition). 
307 !d. at 137. 
308 See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 281-82 (statement of Curtis Gans, Committee for 
the Study of the American Electorate). 
309 See id. 
310 See id. at 282. The study admits that there are some caveats in generalizing from the states 
that have one-step voter registration. For example, in Maine one must register at a different place 
than where one actually votes. In the others, one may vote and register in the same place. In 
addition, these states have a generally homogeneous population, with a history of high voter 
turnout, low incidents of voter fraud, and a tradition of good civic duty. See id. at 281. 
311 See id. at 281-82. 
312 See id. at 311. 
m See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 309. 
314 See id. 
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However, the study estimated that these two components would only 
increase actual turnout by 780,000 and 255,000 respectively.315 
Opponents challenge the liberalization of registration laws as an 
infringement on state autonomy; however, the court decisions in the 
NVRA cases illustrate that election day registration would also be held 
constitutional.316 Opponents also claim liberalization will result in an 
influx of Democratic party voters.317 However, NVRA has also proved 
this concern is minimal or even non-existent.318 
Another claim is that election day registration will result in many 
voters, who otherwise would have registered earlier, to wait until elec-
tion day.319 This would result in increased administrative burdens for 
voting registration offices.32o However, as former New York City Mayor 
David Dinkins testified before Congress, this fear could work as a 
benefit.321 It would provide a tremendous incentive to local election 
officials to register the maximum number of citizens possible prior to 
elections-resulting in more widely instituted outreach programs.322 
The remaining concern is increased voter fraud. 323 It has been 
asserted that long registration deadlines enable state officials to evalu-
ate a voter's legitimacy and decrease voter fraud. 324 In fact, the Su-
preme Court, in Martson v. Lewis, upheld an extremely long registra-
tion deadline.325 Arizona's registration deadline of fifty days before the 
election was found to be reasonable by the state's asserted interest in 
preparing adequate voter lists.326 The Court noted that "[s]tates have 
[a] valid and sufficient interest in providing for some period of time-
m See ill. at 307. 
316 See generally Green, supra note 258. 
317 See Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, 'Motor-Voter'May Steer Future Election Outcomes, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 3, 1995, at 3 (concluding although most thought Democrats would make up 
most new registrations, Independents total a significant number). 
318 See id. 
319 See RICHARD G. SMOLKA, ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION: THE MINNESOTA AND WISCONSIN 
EXPERIENCE IN 197665 (1977). 
320 See ill. at 66. 
m See 1988 Hearings, supra note 142, at 448 (remarks of David N. Dinkins, President, 
Borough of Manhattan, New York City). 
322 See ill. 
323 See SMOLKA, supra note 319, at 65-69 (concluding ability for fraud is great while voter 
turnout gains are minimal); see also David B. Hill, No-On-Site Voter Registration is Not Desirable, 
in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, supra note 33, at 247. 
324 See ill. at 243. 
325 Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 679 (1973); see also Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 686 
(1973) (upholding Georgia's 50 day requirement). 
326 See Marston, 410 U.S. at 681. 
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prior to an election-in order to prepare adequate voter records and 
protect its electoral process from possible frauds. "327 
However, proposed election day registration laws contain signi-
ficant procedural safeguards.328 The 1989 Act would have allowed such 
registration only at the polling place where an individual could vote,329 
and included specific requirements to establish voter identity.33o This 
included completing a standardized form331 and submitting one of the 
specifically approved forms of identification.332 In addition, each ballot 
from an individual registering on election day was kept separate from 
those previously registered, for up to ten days, to determine that all 
votes were properly cast.333 Finally, all individuals who registered on 
election day were mailed a non-forwardable registration verification 
card. 3M Cards that were returned as non-deliverable were evaluated by 
an election official to determine if the return was a result of clerical 
or similar error.335 If a case was not resolved, it was forwarded to the 
United States Attorney and could result in prosecution.336 
In fact, fear of increased fraud is based largely on assumptions that 
there is a direct relationship between non-restrictive voter registration 
laws and voter fraud. 337 However, this view is inaccurate, as indicated 
by national election data.338 For example, North Dakota, the only state 
without any registration requirement, has conducted fraud-free elec-
tions for years.339 In most states, when there is election fraud, it is more 
likely to be conducted by election officials than by private individuals, 
and at the voting rather than the registration stage.34O "Registration 
restrictions thus are ineffective means of combating the more preva-
lent forms of voter fraud."341 
~27 Id. at 680. 
~28 See H.R 17, supra note 29l. 
~29 See id. § 6(a)(1), (2). 
sso See id. § 6(b) (Establishment of Voter Identity). 
S31 See id. § 6(b) (B) (i). 
3S2 See id. § 6(b)(B)(ii). 
33S See H.R 17, supra note 291, at § 6(b)(B)(4)(A)(ii). 
S!14 See id. § 6(b) (B)(4)(C). 
SlI5 See id. 
SS6 See id. 
S37 See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 396. 
S38 See id. 
339 See id. 
S40 See Deborah S. James, Note, Voter Registratitm: A Restrictitm tm the Fundamental Right to 
Vote, 96 YALE L.J. 1615, 1635 (1987); see also Cunningham, supra note 25, at 396. 
~41James, supra note 340, at 1635. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In the presidential election of 1876, participation was more than 
82% of all potential voters, not just registered individuals. Soon there-
after, harsh registration restrictions were instituted, "cloaked in rheto-
ric about stopping corruption but aimed at keeping down the vote of 
'undesirable elements' [immigrants and Black voters]-which they 
did. "342 As a result, lower voter participation rates were not due to a 
decline in Americans' desire to participate, but in the status quo's 
desire for voting equality.343 
The power to vote is an important one that can better an individ-
ual's life or change the leader of a nation. In 1960, President John 
F. Kennedy, defeated Richard Nixon by fewer than 115,000 popular 
votes.1IM In our political system, the right to choose not to vote is also 
extremely importan t. 345 However, abstention from the democratic proc-
ess should be a decision made by the individual and not imposed upon 
him by the failure to trudge through the bureaucratic process.346 Ray-
mond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone observe that "for most Ameri-
cans, voting is the only form of political participation. "347 Therefore, 
the removal of unnecessary obstacles to voting helps enhance public 
involvement in American government and adds to the strength of our 
participatory government. 
The Motor Voter Act was a significant step to improving political 
participation among traditionally disenfranchised groups-particularly 
Black Americans. However, its modest gains illustrate that registration 
barriers still exist. Election-day registration has a proven track record 
of success. Only if the federal government continues to strive to fulfill 
its responsibility to ensure equal opportunity for political participation, 
can we be assured the possibility of a true representational govern-
ment. 

